Abstract. Rising wage inequality in the United States and Britain and rising continental European unemployment have led to a popular view in the economics profession that these two phenomena are related to negative relative demand shocks against the unskilled, combined with flexible wages in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but wage rigidities in continental Europe ('Krugman hypothesis'). This paper tests this hypothesis based on seven large person-level data sets for the 1980s and the 1990s. I use a more sophisticated categorization of low-skilled workers than previous studies, which exhibits differences between German workers with and without apprenticeship training, particularly in the 1980s. I find evidence for the Krugman hypothesis when Germany is compared with the United States. However, supply changes differ considerably between countries, with Britain experiencing enormous increases in skill supply explaining the relatively constant British skill premium in the 1990s.
INTRODUCTION
The last quarter of the twentieth century has seen a significant increase in wage inequality in the United States and Great Britain. However, it seems that this phenomenon has not been observed for Germany to the same extent (cf. Acemoglu, 2003;  1 Dustmann et al., 2007; Fitzenberger, 1999; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Katz and Autor, 1999; Steiner and Wagner, 1998) . In Germany (and other continental European countries), a significant rise in unemployment has occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s, which contrasts with the fall in British and US joblessness rates, especially during the 1990s. This difference in wage inequality and unemployment developments across the Atlantic led to a view which is sometimes called the 'Krugman hypothesis' (Krugman, 1994) . It states that the rise in wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the rise in unemployment in continental Europe are 'two sides of the same coin', namely a fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers across countries. 2 This paper uses several (seven in total) person-level data sets to test whether the low skilled experienced a negative net demand shock in the United States, Britain and West Germany in the 1980s and the 1990s and whether relative wage behaviour for the low skilled was 'rigid' in West Germany but not in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 3 If there is something to the Krugman hypothesis, then Germany -the country with increasing average unemployment -should have experienced a change in the unemployment/non-employment structure such that the relative unemployment likelihood of the unskilled has increased. The United States and Britain, however, should have seen a stable (or converging) unemployment but a flexible wage structure. 1. The large increase in the 90/10 decile ratio reported in Table 1a in Acemoglu (2003) for the early 1980s is most likely due to a change in the underlying original data set for Germany, which occurred in the Luxembourg Income Study between 1981 and 1984 (http:// www.lisproject.org/techdoc/ge/geindex.htm). 2. The main reason for this fall in relative demand for unskilled workers seems to be skill-biased technological change, rather than trade/globalization (cf. Acemoglu, 2002; Berman et al., 1998; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Pflüger, 2001) . See Card and DiNardo (2002) for an alternative view for the United States and Goux and Maurin (2000) for France. 3. As discussed in Section 4, the concept of 'rigidity' employed in this paper is wider than commonly defined, because of the need to allow for increasing unemployment due to 'wage push', which I include in the concept of rigidity. The original formulation of the Krugman hypothesis set out from the assumption that all industrialized countries experienced negative demand shocks against the unskilled and therefore did not take the possibility of wage push into consideration. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 4. Figure A1 in the Appendix plots unemployment rates for the United States, Britain and West Germany from 1980 to 2000. Although there are some issues concerning comparability mentioned in the note to the figure, one may argue that the increase in British and German unemployment in the 1980s was more like a 'catch-up' to standard US levels. It was British, not German, unemployment that became exceptionally high during this period. However, in the 1990s both British and US unemployment fell markedly, whereas German unemployment increased again. From a macro perspective one might wonder whether this divergence is just a temporary cyclical phenomenon. However, it is the fact that the United States and Britain experienced significantly larger increases in wage inequality than Germany, especially in the 1980s when hourly wage inequality in Germany seems to have fallen, as Figure A2 in the Appendix shows, that evoked wage rigidity explanations for rising continental European unemployment and made the Krugman hypothesis so widely accepted.
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r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data sets used. Studies that analyse a wider spectrum of countries often must compromise on data quality (cf. Acemoglu, 2003; Blau and Kahn, 1996; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Kahn, 2000) . The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), for example, contains micro data on many countries, but often only monthly wages for household heads. Furthermore, one has at most four waves available for a two-decade period. Hence it is impossible to trace the developments in the 1980s and 1990s in a robust fashion with these data. Similar reservations apply to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data, where in addition the sample size per country is rather small (about 1,000-2,000 observations). Therefore, for each country investigated in this paper, I use at least one data set with 150,000 workers or more in the labour force (with Britain in the 1980s as the only exception).
Differences in the changes of the relative skill ( proxied by education) supply structures between countries are documented in Section 3. Section 4 presents a 'microeconometric' (using person-level data) test of the Krugman hypothesis in the form of statistical inference on changes in the wage and unemployment as well as non-employment structures. Consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, the results support the view that the rise in German unemployment was accompanied by insufficiently flexible wages in face of negative demand shocks against the low skilled. Section 5 concludes.
DATA
For the United States, I use the Current Population Survey -Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-MORG) files. This is a representative and comfortably large data set frequently used in the related literature. For Britain and West Germany, I use three different data sets. For Britain, the (large) British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) provide the desired information for the 1990s, but for the 1980s I have to use the General Household Survey (GHS), for reasons explained below. For Germany in the 1990s, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the (large) German Labour Force Survey (Mikrozensus, GLFS), and a (large) German administrative data set [Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR)]. Only the latter survey is available since the beginning of the 1980s, when German unemployment increased sharply.
The optimal data set for my purposes would (1) be representative for the whole population of a country, (2) contain a definition of labour force states in accordance with the International Labour Office (ILO) definition, (3) have accurate information on hourly wage rates and (4) contain enough observations to guarantee precise statistical measurement.
The US CPS fulfils virtually all these criteria, although wages would be measured more accurately with administrative data. There has been a recoding of the education variable in 1992, which is treated as suggested by Jaeger (1997). Furthermore, I exclude all imputed earnings whenever they are flagged. However, I checked that the inclusion or exclusion of the flagged imputed wages made virtually no difference to my results (cf. Hirsch and Schumacher, 2002) .
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The British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) is similar to the CPS, but there is no wage information before 1993 in the BLFS. The BHPS has a much smaller sample size than the BLFS, but no clear advantages, except that it can be used as a robustness check. For the 1980s, I use the General Household Survey (GHS), as the BLFS has no wage information during this period and the BHPS has not existed yet. 6 Owing to the design of the GHS, I use only full-time workers to measure changes in the structure of wages, but all workers are used to estimate changes in un-/non-employment structures.
For Germany, the data situation is also complicated (cf. Zimmermann and Wagner, 2002, p. 113) . The GSOEP fulfils all criteria except (4), large sample size, and (3) in the sense that it does not contain administrative wage data. The administrative IABR data is strong on criteria (3) and (4) except that this data is top-coded, excludes very low-wage workers, as well as civil servants. Also, hours of work are not reported, only a full-time/part-time indicator. Moreover, this data set does not meet requirements (1) and (2), as it is only sampling workers and people registered with the labour office who receive some form of unemployment benefit. Nevertheless, for what it measures, the IABR has the most accurate wage data available for Germany. Inconsistent or partly missing education information in the IABR data is corrected as suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2006) . 8 As these data come in spell form, I sample people on the 10th of April each year. The GLFS meets criteria (1), (2) and (4), but fails on (3), as it only measures after-tax (hourly) income within 5. The few top-coded wage observations (around 1 per cent of the data) are multiplied by 1.5, as common in the US literature. 6. As the provided education variable in the BHPS is coded slightly differently than in the BLFS, I recode the BHPS variable to make the two data sets better comparably. People on government schemes are identifiable in each wave and are counted as out of the labour force. The definition of O-level (exams at about the level of US junior high school) and A-level (exams at about the level of US high school) equivalents is different in the GHS from the BLFS, but these differences are not key to the results below. 7. From 1999 onwards, the IABR data contain information on workers with very low earnings (geringfügig Beschäftigte). I exclude these workers from the analysis in order to make the data consistent across time. 8. I use the 'IP4' variable, which is based on Fitzenberger et al. (2006) 'IP3' variable and made available by the data provider IAB. 'IP4' is based on information not available to the research community outside of IAB. I also checked the robustness of the results using alternative imputation methods suggested by these authors (variables 'IP1' and 'IP2'). The main results in this paper are robust to using these alternative imputation methods. However, the results for workers with apprenticeship certificate for the 1990s are not robust to using the non-imputed original variable 'BILD', which is used in the discussion paper version ( Puhani, 2005) .
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r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 intervals. This income can come from any sources, not just labour. Also, the top interval is open (implying top coding). 9 Hence, as none of the German data sets comes close to being optimal for my purposes, it is worthwhile to consider all three data sets for Germany to check the robustness of the results for the 1990s. For the complete 1980s, only the IABR data are available.
If feasible, I create a gross hourly wage variable (including overtime). This is possible in all countries and data sets except the IABR and the GLFS: in the IABR, I only use full-time workers as hours of work are not available; in the GLFS, I create a net hourly income variable for employed people as a proxy for the hourly wage.
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Similar to the previous literature, I measure skill in the education dimension. Education is discretized into four to five groups depending on the data set and country. In order to acknowledge diversity in the educational systems between countries, I preserve the national education categories instead of allocating American labels to non-American degrees. This would be especially difficult in Germany, which operates an apprenticeship system that has no direct equivalent in the United States.
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As some of the previous literature assumes the absence of relative supply shocks, Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of supply structures before the empirical methodology is developed in Section 4. Table 1 demonstrates that, first, even within each decade, there were substantial supply-side changes within the analysed economies (the results presented in the following are robust to the choice of the labour force instead of the working-age population as the proxy for supply). Second, the numbers show that the supply-side changes differed between the three countries. 12 It is shown that, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, all countries have experienced skill upgrading in their working-age populations (the same holds for the labour forces). Indeed, all data sets show an increase in the share of workers 9. Top-coding in the IABR and interval coding in the GLFS are treated by tobit and interval regression (ordered probit with known boundaries), respectively, in Section 4 below. 10. Wages of apprentices are excluded in all German data sets from the wage regressions below.
DIFFERENCES IN SUPPLY CHANGES ACROSS COUNTRIES
In all countries and data sets, wages of self-employed workers are excluded in the analysis of wage structures, but self-employed workers are counted as employed in the analysis of unemployment and non-employment. 11. Numbers of observations for each data set and sample unemployment and non-employment rates for different skill groups (using sampling weights as provided in the respective data sets) are available from the author. I only use observations with valid information on education, age, gender and region (an exception is the German IABR data, where imputed values for education are used as suggested by Fitzenberger et al., 2006) . 12. There were also substantial differences in the changes of the age structures between the three countries. I will therefore -besides education, gender and region -control for age in the regressions below to account for changes in other dimensions of skill than education. who have a degree as well as a decrease in the share of workers with the lowest level of education. However, these changes were most pronounced in Britain, caused by educational reforms (cf. Machin, 1996 Machin, , 1998 . The share of workers with no qualification in the working-age population (as well as in the labour force) decreased by 8 percentage points in Britain during the 1990s and by even 17 percentage points in the 1980s.
In the light of these results, the following section will apply a methodology to test the statements of the Krugman hypothesis without making any assumptions on the nature of supply (or demand) shocks.
DIFFERENCES IN THE CHANGES OF THE WAGE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND NON-EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURES

Identification of relative net demand shocks and relative wage rigidities
The methodology applied in this section identifies relative net demand shocks (i.e. 'expanding' and 'shrinking' labour markets) and wage rigidities from estimates based on person-level data. Conceptually, it draws on Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) and Nickell and Bell (1996) in that it uses unemployment/nonemployment as a measure of quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market to clear) in the presence of wage rigidities. However, unlike these previous studies, I consider several classes of skill in the education dimension and control for these as well as other labour market characteristics (age, gender, region) in a regression framework in both the wage and unemployment models. The modelling approach does not exclude that there is competition between heterogeneous types of labour. However, I assume that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative wage raises relative unemployment for any particular type of labour. Furthermore, changes in relative unemployment must not be caused by changes in relative frictional unemployment. The modelling assumptions are outlined in the following. Three alternative explanations for the empirical evidence are discussed and refuted at the end of Section 4.2.
Theoretical justification -net demand shocks
In order to make out expanding and shrinking labour markets, I discuss a model that shows how 'net relative demand shocks' can be identified from the observation of relative wage and unemployment/non-employment changes. Drawing on the notation of Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) , relative supply and demand in labour market l can be written as
13. The formulation of the model has been altered significantly from the discussion paper version thanks to the suggestions of an anonymous referee.
where S l and D l denote relative supply and demand for labour type l. W l is a vector of wage rates and Z S l and Z D l are relative supply and demand 'shift factors', like the size of the respective labour force, technological change or domestic and foreign demand. As I do not explicitly discuss cross-wage effects here, they are subsumed under the shift factors. In a perfectly competitive market, the market-clearing relative wage is determined by equating relative demand to relative supply. Relative unemployment would then be zero. Because frictional unemployment may prevail, I consider changes in unemployment and wages between two points in time. By totally differentiating supply and demand, and imposing the condition that there is no change in unemployment (quantity rationing) dU l 5 dS l À dD l 5 0, one obtains
where, for example, S l,W and D l,W are the partial derivatives of relative supply and demand with respect to the relative wage for labour type l, respectively. For reasons not modelled here, for example public sector pay scales or trade union power, the movement of the relative wage toward its market-clearing level might be inhibited, so that the observed change in the relative wage dW l is
r l is a disequilibrium or 'rigidity' parameter preventing the actual wage from adjusting such that unemployment remains constant. This additive specification is more flexible than a more specific notion of 'rigidity' that would implicitly define the rigidity parameterr l as dW l ¼ ð1 Àr l ÞdW * l , because it makes possible that dW l 6 ¼ 0 although dW * l ¼ 0. For example, it might be that minimum-wage laws or trade unions push up relative wages, although relative demand and supply have not changed.
14 If the wage does not move according to the forces of supply and demand, then there will be adjustment in terms of changes in quantity rationing, i.e. dU l 5 dS l À dD l 6 ¼ 0. Substituting for the supply and demand changes yields:
where
If relative labour supply and demand are well-behaved, U l,W will be positive. As can be deduced from equation (4), observation of the signs of the changes in wage and unemployment rates between two points in time (dW l and dU l ) identify the sign of the change in the relative net supply shift effect (i.e. the relative net supply shock) dZ l in seven out of nine cases, similarly as in Table 2 . Note that a relative negative net demand shock is equivalent to a positive relative net supply shock, 14. The political forces that might cause this development are outside the scope of this model and not observed in the data. i.e. dZ l 40. A negative relative net demand shock implies a 'shrinking' market, that is, at a given wage, demand is falling faster than supply.
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Empirical implementation
In order to take the above concepts to individual ( person-level) data, I define a labour market l by its characteristics x l (here education, age, gender and region). The reference labour market in relation to which wage and unemployment changes are defined is denoted by x. Depending on whether the 1980s or the 1990s are investigated,
x is defined as the 1980 or 1991 sample mean of the labour force, respectively).
15 Changes in relative wage and unemployment structures are tracked year by year, i.e. from 1981 to 1990 and from 1992 up to 2000, with respect the 1980 or 1991 sample mean, respectively. W l and U l are the relative wage and unemployment rates for labour type l and are defined in terms of expected values of the wage rate w and the unemployment indicator u 5 1(unemployed), respectively. 16 The base years (1980 or 1991) are indicated by t, the following years by t þ t. Hence, for each reporting year t þ t, I define
In order to identify labour market characteristics associated with relative wage or unemployment changes, I parametrize the distributions of w and u by loglinear wage regressions and probit models of the unemployment status. These regressions are estimated using person-level data. A transformed version of the (dummy variable) coefficients of these non-linear parametric regression models forms the basis for the classification of each labour market characteristic x k (here low level of education as a proxy measure for a low level of skill) to its contribution to relative wage and unemployment changes. This contribution is measured by the changes in the transformed (denoted by an asterisk) coefficients over time, ðb * tþt;k À b * t;k Þ and ðg * tþt;k À g * t;k Þ, of the wage and unemployment regressions, respectively. The transformed coefficients (as well as their standard errors) are calculated as in Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) 
where I is the identity matrix and W a matrix containing weights, which in my case are the base period (1980 or 1991) sample means. This transformation sets the 'base category' for all dummy variables equal to the base period sample mean. Hence, instead of classifying each conceivable labour market defined by all dummy variable groups, one can just classify each labour market characteristic x k into one of the 15. Data availability is the reason for a separate consideration of the 1980s and the 1990s. Data availability (for Germany) is also the reason why 1991 and not 1990 is chosen as the base year for the 1990s. Below, I will also discuss sensitivity checks with respect to the base year. 16. 1(g) is the indicator function that takes on value 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. The terminology 'expanding market' refers to a positive relative net demand shock (which is the same as a negative relative net supply shock dZ l o0 for labour market l with respect to the reference market r as defined in Section 4). Expanding markets relative to the reference market are identified in cases (6), (7) and (8). Analogously, a 'shrinking market' is equivalent to a negative net demand shock. Shrinking markets relative to the reference market are identified in cases (2), (3) and (4). In cases (1) and (9), the sign of the net demand shock cannot be identified, dZ l 5 ?. In case (5), there is no such shock. See also the theoretical discussion in Section 4. nine cells defined in Table 2 , depending on whether it contributed to a rising, constant or falling relative wage rate or unemployment likelihood.
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Empirical results on relative net demand shocks and relative wage rigidities
In order to focus the discussion, Tables 3 and 4 present the classification results as defined in Table 2 for the low-skilled groups only. Table 3 reports results for the 1980s with 1980 as the base year, after which unemployment rose sharply (cf. Figure A1) . Results for the 1990s are displayed in Table 4. 17 Table 3 Low level of education classification summary for the 1980s (bold codes 1, 2 and 3 indicate rigidity) Variable 1981 Variable 1982 Variable 1983 Variable 1984 Variable 1985 Variable 1986 Variable 1987 Variable 1988 Variable 1989 Variable 1990 With Between four and five different categories of educational levels are distinguished in the estimations (depending on the data set, as exhibited in Table 1) , rather than only allowing for two skill types as in the studies by Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) or Nickell and Bell (1996) . This is important because more than half of the German population has received vocational training (apprenticeship), whereas just 20 per cent have obtained only ordinary school education. This latter share is much higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries, at around 50 per cent in the United States and even higher in Britain (cf. Table 1 ). The classification results are based on two-sided t-tests with the null hypothesis that there were no changes in the coefficients of the wage or the unemployment/non-employment equation for a certain low-skill characteristic, for example education below apprenticeship level, between the base year (1980 or 1991) and the reporting year mentioned at the top of each column. Sizes of 5 per cent of these t-tests correspond to a level of 10 per cent (which is the upper bound of the true size, the lower bound being 5 per cent) of the Bonferroni joint test of the null hypothesis ðb * tþt;k Àb * t;k Þ ¼ ðĝ * tþt;k Àĝ * t;k Þ ¼ 0. The type of classification is reported as a number that corresponds to the numbers in Table 2 . If the Krugman (1994) hypothesis were to hold, one would expect that low-skilled categories in West Germany be classified as either (1) 'wage push', (2) 'rigid in a shrinking market', or, if wages were somewhat but not sufficiently flexible, as (3) 'partly adjusting in a shrinking market'. In the United States and in Britain, one would only expect relative wage adjustments, but no changes in relative quantity rationing (at least not to the disadvantage of the unskilled). Hence, low-skilled characteristics for these countries should be classified as (4) 'fully adjusting in a shrinking market'. Although there is evidence for the Krugman hypothesis in the data, it turns out that the results are not as 'clean'. Tables 3 and 4 present classification results for the education coefficients (as a proxy measure for skill) in the three countries for the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. I report only the two lowest education groups in each country, which are high school and high school dropouts in the United States, O-level Table 4 Continued Variable 1992 1993 1995 1997 base 1993 
Testing the Krugman hypothesis with respect to the education dimension of skill
Apprenticeship 3 For the lowest education groups in these countries, there is a clear contrast between the Anglo-Saxon economies on the one hand, and West Germany on the other. The large data sets in Germany predominantly display classifications (1) (GLFS data) and (3) (IABR data): the IABR data suggest that in the 1990s, relative wages were falling, in contrast to the 1980s, when they were rising. 18 In the United States, by contrast, only the 'flexible' classifications (4) and (9) are observed in the 1990s. Classification (4) also dominates during the end of the 1980s. In Britain, the least skilled group seems not to have experienced a negative relative net demand shock in the 1990s as it did in the 1980s. This can be explained by the strong decrease in the relative supply of the least educated group in Britain in the 1990s (cf. Table 1), which must have netted out a relative 'gross' demand shock against this group. Hence, although the differences between West Germany and the United States are striking and consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, the British evidence points to the potential importance of supply-side effects, which clearly differed between countries, as shown in Section 3.
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Considering the second-lowest skill groups, there is no consistent picture supporting the Krugman hypothesis. In the United States, classification (4) predominates in both the 1980s and the 1990s. The evidence from the large British BLFS data set, however, suggests insufficiently flexible relative wages in terms of classification (3) for the late 1990s (nothing much happened in the 1980s and early 1990s). In West Germany, the evidence for the 1990s is not entirely robust across data sets, but the large GLFS and IABR mostly indicate relative wage rigidity in the form of classifications (1), (2) and (3). Note, however, that both the IABR and GSOEP data indicate that at least in the middle of the 1990s, the relative demand for apprenticeship graduates was rising, as shown by classification (6): 'fully adjusting in an expanding market'. In the 1980s, I find no robust evidence for relative wage rigidities affecting workers with apprenticeship training: classifications (4) and (9) dominate. 18. The point estimates of the small GSOEP data set also suggest rising relative unemployment for the least skilled and falling relative wages, but especially the former are mostly not significant as the classifications in Table 4 show. 19. In the 1980s, choosing 1981 or 1982 instead of 1980 as the base year leads to similar results: the contrast between the Anglo-Saxon economies and Germany becomes even stronger, as the 'rigid' in the sense of 'partly adjusting' classification (3) vanishes almost completely in these robustness checks for the United States and Britain. The German results, however, are robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984; cf. Steiner and Wagner, 1998) . In the 1990s, the classification results for West Germany are robust to the choice of 1992 as the base period in all three data sets and in both the models with unemployment and non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing. If 1993 is chosen as the base period, however, the 'fully adjusting' classification (4) dominates in the IABR data. Classification results are robust for the British BHPS data with 1992 or 1993 as the base, as well as the US results if 1993 is chosen as the base period. Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 If I use non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing (cf. the lowest panel of Table 3 for the 1980s and the lower panel of Table 4 for the 1990s), the results for the 1990s are very similar to those obtained for unemployment as the measure for quantity rationing, except that in the British BLFS the lowest instead of the second-lowest skill group displays relative wage rigidity [classification (2)]. For the 1980s, however, the Krugman hypothesis breaks down if non-employment is used as the measure for quantity rationing, because wages for the lowest skill groups are now indicated to be rigid in the sense of classification (3) in both Britain and the United States (for Germany, the only data set available for the complete 1980s is the IABR, which does not allow to measure non-employment as opposed to unemployment). 
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Evidence for and qualifications to the Krugman hypothesis
Apart from relying on the classification results based on statistical inference, a look at the point estimates presented graphically in Figures 1 and 2 helps to illustrate the different experiences of the three countries. The US educational wage structure displayed in Figures 1(a) and 2(a) shows how educational wage inequality increased fairly smoothly throughout the two decades (there might be short pauses in this trend in the late 1980s and the mid-1990s). By contrast, both the educational unemployment (and non-employment) structures became more equal since the mid-1980s. The most striking support for Krugman's hypothesis is revealed by a comparison of the changes in West Germany's unemployment structure with the one of the United States in the 1990s [cf. Figures 2(a) and (c) ]. The German unemployment structure has become more unequal, whereas the one in the United States has become more equal. This is exactly what the Krugman hypothesis states. The least educated in West Germany have also faced an increase in their non-employment likelihood in this period, which is not the case for the least skilled in the United States, who have experienced a decrease (results are available on request).
However, albeit insufficiently flexible, the West German wage structure has not been completely rigid for workers without apprenticeship in the 1990s; cf. Figure 2(c) . Whereas low-skilled workers both with and without apprenticeship seem to have been affected by some form of wage rigidity in the 1990s, this is not true in the 1980s. In fact, for the 1980s, the Krugman 20. As in the case of the lowest education groups, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are robust to the choice of alternative base years. For the 1980s, there is no change to the main results if 1981 or 1982 instead of 1980 is chosen as base year. The German results are also robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984, cf. Steiner and Wagner, 1998) . For the 1990s, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are robust to the choice of 1992 or 1993 as base period in all three German data sets; and in the British BLFS in both the models with unemployment and non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing. The US results are also robust when 1993 is chosen as the base period (note that 1991 is not a useful choice due to the definition change of the education variable between 1991 and 1992; cf. Section 2). The jump in the relative wages of workers with a degree in the IABR data is explained by a statistical phenomenon: since 1984, companies have to include fringe benefits when reporting wages for this data set (Steiner and Wagner, 1998) . In the paper's text and footnotes, I therefore report sensitivity checks with respect to the choice of the base period for the classifications. It turns out that the change in measurement does not affect the classification results for low-skilled workers in the sense that classification results are essentially the same no matter whether 1980, 1981, 1982 or 1984 is chosen as base year. shows that, compared with the US experience, the British educational wage structure was fairly stable during the 1990s, although the developments were similar in both countries in the 1980s [cf. Figures 1(a) and (b) ]. The educational unemployment structure did not become much more unequal in either the 1980s or the 1990s [cf. Figures  1(b) and 2(b) ], which contrasts with the German experience. What is interesting about comparing Britain and Germany in the 1980s is that despite large increases in the aggregate unemployment rate in both countries in the early 1980s with a subsequent decrease in the late 1980s (cf. Figure A1 ), in Britain, these shocks were not accompanied by large swings in the structure of unemployment as they were in Germany. This is further support for the view that unemployment in Germany is more related to the failure of relative wages between skill groups to clear the markets, so that we observe changes in relative quantity rationing. For Britain, the broad picture that a stable wage structure could be sustained in the 1990s, without relative unemployment increases for the least educated as in West Germany, can be explained by the substantial relative supply changes, as discussed in Section 3.
Are there alternative explanations?
4.2.3.1. Sample selection. Although the evidence presented here (especially when West Germany and the United States are compared) is broadly consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, especially in the 1990s, one may raise alternative explanations for these regression results. One argument could be based on the issue of sample selection in wage regressions (Heckman, 1979; Leung and Yu, 1996) : in the face of relative demand shocks against the unskilled, one expects workers with the least unobserved skills to lose their jobs first. Hence, standard wage regressions as presented here might falsely conclude that the wage structure between observed skill categories has remained stable, whereas in fact the price of skills (taking into account observed and unobserved factors) has fallen. At the same time, one would measure an increase in the relative unemployment and non-employment of the least skilled workers, as they either leave the labour force or prefer to draw unemployment benefits instead of working for a lower wage. However, if this explanation is claimed to be the only factor underlying the present results, then one would expect an increase in the relative unemployment or relative non-employment for the low skilled not only in West Germany, but also in the United States. Yet, this did not happen to low education groups in the United States in the 1990s (it did in the 1980s; cf. Tables 3 and 4) . Therefore, the 'sample selection interpretation' cannot be the main factor driving the empirical observations of this paper for the 1990s. 4.2.3.2. Changes in search intensity. Another alternative explanation could be that changes in the search intensities of low-skilled workers drive differences across countries in the changes in the relative unemployment and nonemployment likelihoods. If this were the case, the Krugman hypothesis would not be the correct interpretation of the results presented here. In the 1990s, major reforms of the unemployment benefit and welfare systems in the United State and in Britain with their emphasis on mandatory job search assistance and the introduction of work requirements were, with the exception of the British New Deal of 1998, not explicitly targeted at less educated workers (cf. Blank and Haskins, 2001 ; Monthly Labor Review, various issues; Weil, 2002 ; for the United States; Van Reenen, 2001 ; for Britain). However, the US profiling system for unemployment insurance introduced since 1993 and significant welfare reform triggered by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 can be expected to have taken effect mostly on these socio-economic groups (Blank, 2002) . The same holds in Britain for the introduction of the Jobseekers' Allowance in 1996 and the New Deal of 1998. However, also in Germany, welfare eligibility was made more stringent and work incentives were increased through the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. Moreover, there were no significant changes in the unemployment benefit regime in Germany during the 1990s that could explain the increased relative unemployment of the low skilled.
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In the early 1980s, changes in German regulations made unemployment benefit receipt more stringent, but still relative unemployment of the low skilled increased. Since 1984, the system became more generous again, especially for older workers (Steffen, 2008) . Therefore, the steady upward trend in relative unemployment for the least skilled in Germany is not consistent with the timing of changes in unemployment benefit regulations in the 1980s. Similarly, the timing of major changes in unemployment benefit policy in the United States and Britain in the 1980s does not concur with the development of the relative unemployment structures in Figure 1 . The relative unemployment likelihood of the least skilled in Britain remained rather constant overall and even increased despite the introduction of the Restart programme in 1987 (cf. Dolton and O'Neill, 2002) . Also in the United States, the development of the unemployment structure is rather smooth, despite the large drop in benefit take-up rates in the early 1980s (cf. Blank and Card, 1991; Vroman, 1998) . Nevertheless the tightening of eligibility rules since the mid-1980s by many states may have contributed to the decline in relative unemployment of the least skilled (cf. Monthly Labor Review, various issues).
21. The only potential exceptions are increases in the minimum age for certain prolonged entitlement periods for unemployment benefits in 1997. These affected workers above 42 years of age. However, these changes, which for any given age group only altered the entitlement period by two months (e.g. from 14 to 12 months for 42-year-olds), were rather minor. A summary of social policy changes in Germany since the 1970s is provided in German in Steffen (2008) .
Business cycles.
A third critique of the interpretation of the results might argue that the three countries are observed at different stages of their business cycles and that changes in wage and unemployment structures are mere reflections of movements within different stages of the business cycle. This argument also does not stand up to scrutiny: although there are some movements in the wage and unemployment/non-employment structures, visual inspection of these movements in Figures 1 and 2 provides no support that the movement towards more equality in the unemployment structure of the United States is a mere cyclical phenomenon. Instead it seems to be a trend-like movement from the early 1980s onwards, two decades being a much longer period than the average cycle (cf. Stock and Watson, 1999) . Similarly, no cyclical movements can be detected for Britain. In Germany, the increase in relative unemployment of the least skilled has also been a trendlike process in the 1990s and to some extent even in the 1980s, although in the 1980s the sharp increase in unemployment inequality between educational groups had been concurrent with the decreasing growth rates in the early 1980s. Similarly, unemployment inequality decreased during the boom in 1989/1990. Nevertheless, even in the 1980s, the relative unemployment incidence of the least skilled in Germany moved almost monotonically upward and never reached the low level of the early 1980s again. Hence, the continuing deterioration in the relative unemployment position of the least skilled in Germany seems to be a systematic problem of the last two decades.
CONCLUSIONS
Although it seems a consensus view among economists that rising European unemployment and rising inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries are 'two sides of the same coin', namely a secular fall in the relative demand for the low skilled ('Krugman hypothesis'), there are only few empirical studies testing this hypothesis with individual data. The existing evidence shows mixed results (Card et al., 1999; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Krueger and Pischke, 1998; Bell, 1995, 1996) .
22
In this paper, I show that the assumption of the absence of supply shocks made in some of the previous literature is not justified. Indeed, there were substantial changes in the education (and age) structures of the working-age population as well as the labour force in all three countries I investigated. More importantly, these changes clearly differed between the three countries. Therefore, I develop a methodology that does not rely on the assumption of no supply shocks nor does it assume that demand shocks can be proxied. My approach thus differs from Krueger and Pischke (1998) . So do my results:
22. Estimates of structural models of nominal and/or real wage rigidities in Germany are provided in Bauer et al. (2003) , Beissinger and Knoppik (2001) , Cornelien and Hübler (2006) and Fehr et al. (2003) , for example.
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r 2008 The Author Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 contrary to these authors (and contrary to Card et al., 1999 , for France, Canada and the United States), I find some support for the Krugman hypothesis. Although being conceptually related to Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) and Bell (1995, 1996) , my methodology is not restricted to only two skill groups ('high' and 'low') . I show that by preserving national specificities in the empirical analysis, some differences arise between low-skilled Germans with and those without apprenticeship training. Unlike the latter group, German workers with apprenticeship were only affected by relative wage rigidities in the 1990s, but not in the 1980s. The previous literature which has attempted to harmonize educational categories across countries was not able to detect this difference (cf. Acemoglu, 2003; Blau and Kahn, 1996; Kahn, 2000) . For Britain, it is shown that relative supply effects helped to keep the educational wage structure constant in the 1990s. 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 US (CPS) UK registered Germany standardized Figure A1 Unemployment rates, 1980-2000 Notes: The US unemployment rate is based on the CPS, which uses a definition of unemployment equivalent to the ILO definition. For West Germany, OECD figures only provide the registered unemployment rate for a longer time period. Comparing the registered with the OECD standardized unemployment rate for united Germany suggests about a 1.5 per cent difference between the two, so that the standardized unemployment rate for West Germany would also be lower than depicted in the graph. For the UK, however, the standardized unemployment rate is about 1 percentage point higher than the registered one shown in the graph. It is, however, not available for such a long time period. Source: OECD.
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